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Abstract
A state-independent quantum key distribution (SIQKD) protocol is proposed that utilises qubits
to establish a raw key, irrespective of the qubit states. Time-like sequential measurements lead to
an inequality formally identical to the Bell-CHSH inequality, which relies only on the measurements
performed. It is shown that this form manifests naturally from non-commutativity of observables.
The state-independence of SIQKD arises due the employment of the BTCV temporal Bell-CHSH
inequality [1, 2] – constructed from time-like sequential measurements on a single qubit system –
to detect eavesdropping. In the light of quantum information theory, rendering applications state-
independent eliminates the need for complex processes to prepare and manipulate quantum states.
One such application is demonstrated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is a powerful cryptographic tool in quantum information theory
that relies on quantum features such as superposition and non-locality to provide a secure
key technique at a distance without any assumptions made on the computational power of
a potential disruptor or eavesdropper. Thus far, qubit states have been used to establish
a raw key between two parties, from which a classical key is distilled through classical
information reconciliation [3]. Additionally, non-locality viz. the Bell inequality [4] has been
operationally employed for intuitive device-independence for certain cryptographic protocols
[5, 6].
Two seminal quantum protocols for raw key generation are the BB84 [3] and Ekert [5]
methods. The BB84 protocol involves one party sending the second a string of qubits over
a quantum channel, and the ensuing secure key generation relies on measurement matching.
The Ekert protocol employs the Bell-CHSH inequality [7] to test for eavesdropping through
the use of entangled qubit pairs that are shared between the two communicating parties.
While it provides device-independent security, it relies on the entangled pairs being shared
beforehand. At the heart of these protocols and variations thereof lie the generation and
manipulation of quantum states.
The preparation of quantum states is in itself a vast area of study, prone to obstacles
such as decoherence [8]. While the ideal experimental scenario involves the preparation of
a quantum system in a pure state, the reality is that the state inevitably interacts with its
environment to evolve into more of a statistical mixture of pure states, or a mixed state. In
this manner, quantum information is irreversibly leaked.
While advances in quantum optics hope to curb this leakage (see [9] and citations therein),
applications that are state-independent would eliminate the need for complex processes to
prepare and manipulate quantum states. In this paper, one such application is provided.
The state-independent quantum key distribution (SIQKD) protocol proposed here has at its
core correlations that are not space-like separated, but time-like separated. To realise this,
we employ the Brukner-Taylor-Cheung-Vedral (BTCV) formalism [1, 2], which makes use
of sequential projective measurements on a single system, as opposed to measurements on
space-like separated coupled systems.
The BTCV formulation relies solely on the measurement operators, and one can therefore
not make a comment on the non-classicality of the state. However, in some sense, one can
say that all states can violate this inequality, even fully mixed ones [10]. Correlations in time
can be considered manifestations of sequential measurements. They provide an operational
probabilistic framework that can be applied to enhance probabilities of success in classical
protocols such as computational complexity tasks, as demonstrated in [1, 2].
In the SIQKD protocol, the BTCV formalism provides a probabilistic tool that allows
two parties to detect an eavesdropper even if the initial state is completely mixed – thus
rendering it truly state-independent. We begin with a brief overview of the time-like Bell-
CHSH inequality in Section II with important notes on the origin of the state-independence
and whether the correlations can be considered non-classical, then proceed to SIQKD in
Section III.
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II. BTCV TIME-LIKE BELL-CHSH INEQUALITY
We briefly discuss the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality as given in [1, 2], further studied
in [11], and experimentally verified in [10].
Consider an arbitrary two-level mixed state: ρ = 1
2
[I+~σ ·~r]. Probability of measurement
with observable A = ~σ ·~a yielding outcome k at time t1 is Tr[ρΠkA], where ΠkA is the projector
associated with outcome k. Probability of measurement with observable B = ~σ ·~b yielding
outcome l at time t2 is Tr[Π
k
AΠ
l
B] where Π
l
B is the projector associated with outcome l.
Therefore, the correlation function between the measurements at the two times is given by:
C(~a,~b) =
∑
k,l=±1
klTr[ρΠkA]Tr[Π
k
AΠ
l
B] (1)
where ΠkA =
1
2
[I + k~σ · ~a], ΠlB = 12 [I + l~σ ·~b].
This leads to:
C(~a,~b) = ~a ·~b, (2)
This correlation function is similar in form to the quantum mechanical correlation func-
tion for the spin-1
2
singlet state, as solely being dependent on the angle between ~a and ~b.
Moreover, it is remarkably state-independent, that is, it is independent of the initial state ρ.
Thus whether the initial qubit state was mixed or pure is irrelevant, as once the initial mea-
surement is performed, the resulting state is that corresponding to the projector associated
with the outcome.
Note that any qubit dynamics between t1 and t2 can be represented as well by a rotation
matrix R ∈ SO(3). Prior to the second measurement, the state is R(k~a) = kR(~a), where
k = ±1. The probability for obtaining the outcome l is 1
2
(1 + kl~b · R(~a)). The correlator
becomes C = R(~a) ·~b [11].
Through classical constraints, the bound imposed on the temporal analog of the Bell-
CHSH expression is:
B ≡ |C(~a1, ~b1) + C(~a1, ~b2) + C(~a2, ~b1)− C(~a2, ~b2)| ≤ 2 (3)
Maximal violation occurs at 2
√
2 for ~a1 =
1√
2
(~b1 + ~b2) and ~a2 =
1√
2
(~b1 − ~b2). Therefore,
the Tsirelson bound [12] can be reached by appropriate measurements on the Bloch sphere.
A. Measurement at t2 Where t1 < t2 < t3
If three sequential measurements (~σ · ~a), (~σ ·~b), (~σ · ~c) were considered instead of two, at
times t1 < t2 < t3, then the correlation function between t1 and t3 is [1, 2]:
C(~a,~c) =
∑
k,l,s=±1
klsTr[ρΠkA]Tr[Π
k
AΠ
l
B]Tr[Π
l
BΠ
s
C ] (4)
= (~a ·~b)(~b · ~c) (5)
Therefore: 1) the quantum correlation function for measurements at m instances can
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be considered a product of two-fold temporal correlations, and 2) measurement at t2 dis-
rupts correlations between measurements at t1 and t3 as the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality
between t1 and t3 is no longer violated - a straightforward algebraic exercise.
B. Non-commutativity and the Time-like Bell-CHSH Inequality
For the sake of conceptual clarity, we show how the Bell-CHSH inequality derived by
[1, 2] can be understood as a natural arisal from the non-commutativity of observables and
not a reflection of non-classical correlations in time. Indeed, the non-classicality in this
formalism can be attributed to non-commutativity and the symmetric nature of conditional
probabilities in quantum physics.
Proposition: A state-independent Bell-CHSH inequality can be derived by non-commuting
observables, provided the first observable, A, shares an eigen basis with the original state,
ρ, that is: [A, ρ] = 0.
Proof: Consider three non-commuting dichotomic observables A, B and C, where A shares
an eigen basis with state ρ = 1
2
[1+~σ ·~p]. Thus, the projectors of A corresponding to outcomes
±1 are:
ΠA± =
1
2
[1± ~σ · ~p] (6)
Projectors of B and C take a similar form, defined by variables ~b,~c respectively:
ΠB± =
1
2
[1± ~σ ·~b]
ΠC± =
1
2
[1± ~σ · ~c] (7)
As A,B,C are non-commuting, Tr[Πi±Πj±] ≥ 0 always, where i, j = A,B,C and i 6= j.
Hence, a reasonable conclusion is that Tr[ΠA±ΠB±ΠC± + ΠC±ΠB±ΠA±] ≥ 0 always.
Without loss of generality, we consider the symmetrised product of projectors ΠA+,ΠB+,ΠC+
in the form of a pseudo-projection operator as given in [13], and omit the outcome index +
for convenience:
ΠABC =
1
16
[
ΠAΠBΠC + ΠCΠBΠA
]
=
1
16
[
2 + 2(~σ · ~p) + 2(~σ ·~b) + 2(~σ · ~c) + 2(~σ · ~p)((~σ ·~b) + (~σ · ~c))+ 2(~σ ·~b)(~σ · ~c)
+ (~σ · ~p)(~σ ·~b)(~σ · ~c) + (~σ · ~c)(~σ ·~b)(~σ · ~p)
]
(8)
This pseudo-projection operator is Hermitian, but not indempotent, ergo ‘pseudo’. Tak-
ing the trace, one finds:
Tr[ΠABC ] =
1
16
(
4 + 4~p · (~b+ ~c) + 4(~b · ~c)
)
(9)
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We know Tr[ΠABC ] ≥ 0, that is, 1+~p·(~b+~c). Taking~b→ −~b and ~c→ −~c, and combining
the two we find:
1 + (~b · ~c) ≥ 0 (10)
Note that Eq. 10 is the symmetric conditional probability employed in the time-like
correlation function given in Eq. 1, namely:
P (B|C) = P (C|B) = Tr[ΠBΠC ]
= Tr[
1
2
(1 + ~σ ·~b)1
2
(1 + ~σ · ~c)] (11)
This symmetrisation is at the heart of quantum physics, being impossible in the classical
scenario, and is a feature that is exploited by the Bell-CHSH inequality.
In order to bring this to the Bell-CHSH form, we consider four orientations ~b1, ~b2, ~c1, ~c2:
1 + (~b1 · ~c1) + 1 + (~b1 · ~c2)− 1− (~b2 · ~c2) + 1 + (~b2 · ~c1) ≥ 0
=⇒ ~b1 · (~c1 + ~c2) + ~b2 · (~c1 − ~c2) ≤ 2  (12)
C. Short Note: Non-classicality and the Temporal Correlations
That the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality of the BTCV prescription can be violated maxi-
mally is on its own not enough to suggest that the correlations are non-classical, even though
the inequality arises from a non-classical construction as previously mentioned. The Toner-
Bacon 1-bit protocol [14], used to simulate the singlet state, can easily be implemented
to simulate the temporal correlations [15]. Moreover, a sequence of T-B protocols can be
implemented to mimic sequential projective measurements, as the correlations are factored
into dot product pairs as shown in Eq. 4.
An assessment of non-classicality, defined by the classical simulability of a temporal
correlation, is given in [15]. A temporal correlation function of an d-level physical system
is said to be non-classical if every classical algorithm that simulates the function requires
more than log2 d bits of classical communication at some point during the simulation. In
[15], a lower bound is provided for the number of sequential measurements to be performed
in order for the correlations to be non-classical. For a qudit, the number of measurements,
n, should follow n ≥ d.
This is important to note before making a claim on the non-classicality of the correlations.
However, in the SIQKD protocol proposed ahead, it is unnecessary to ensure non-classical
correlations in the sense described above, as the protocol relies instead on a violation of
the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality, which is an algebraic consequence of the non-classical
conditional probabilities. Indeed, this sequence of measurements may be realised through
classically polarised electromagnetic waves, a representation of which is shown in Figure 1,
considering the use of two half wave plates with principle axes coinciding with ~a1 and ~b1
respectively. The correlation function C(~a1, ~b1) = ~a1 · ~b1 relies on the angle between the two.
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FIG. 1. Representation of an experimental realisation of the correlation function C( ~a1, ~b1) = cos θ
Because this sequence of measurements leads to an inequality formally identical to the
Bell-CHSH inequality, we continue to make use of this terminology. With this disclaimer,
we proceed to the protocol.
III. STATE-INDEPENDENT SECURE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
The implementation of a successful quantum key generation protocol requires two parts:
1) the quantum part, which establishes a raw key between two parties, and 2) classical post
processing, in which privacy amplification and information reconciliation lead to a distillation
of the final one-time pad from the raw key. These parts are often explored separately, yet if
the tools required for post-processing could somehow be used in the initial quantum stage
to generate the key, a level of security may be introduced. One such proposal is offered here.
In this protocol, the raw key is generated ensuring security through a state-independent
method following [1, 2], that relies on the final key that will ultimately be used as a one-
time pad. The protocol involves two separate parties, Alice and Bob. It is Alice who locally
randomly generates a binary string X2 within her sealed lab, a part of which will be used
to generate the final key. The crux of this protocol is conveying this string securely to Bob,
without a third eavesdropping party, Eve, gaining knowledge of it.
We begin with the labelling conventions and assumptions behind this protocol.
6
A. Labelling Conventions
Alice performs measurements with dichotomic observables Ai, which rely on parameters
~ai. Likewise, Bob’s dichotomic observables are denoted by Bi with parameters ~bi.
Auxiliary random variables are made use of to aid with the execution of this protocol,
drawing inspiration from the prescriptions of privacy amplification and information recon-
ciliation in [16–20]. Each is a string of n-dimensional bits, viz. X1 = {xi1}i=ni=1 . We shall
denote random variables in Alice’s subsystem by Xi and in Bob’s subsystem as Yi. Random
variables X1 and Y1 are classically correlated with a probability distribution P (X1, Y1), and
are shared between Alice and Bob. Eavesdropping party, Eve, may have partial or complete
information of the distribution P (X1, Y1), which still allows for safe key distillation [16]. The
string that will ultimately be used to determine the key, X2, is locally randomly generated
in Alice’s sealed labto guarantee Eve has no knowledge of it.
The following additional variables are defined:
U1 = X1 ⊕X2
V1 = Y1 ⊕ Y2 (13)
in which ⊕ indicates bitwise binary addition, and where Y2 will be defined at a later
stage. Note: all ‘addition’ is modulo 2 for bits, but can be extended for higher dimensions
as well.
B. The Assumptions
• What is referred to as a qubit is in actuality a qubit ensemble, for the determination
of probabilities.
• Qubits, that is the qubit ensembles, are prepared in Alice’s sealed laboratory.
• Observables A1, A2, B1, B2 are selected such that maximal violation of the time-like
Bell-CHSH inequality given by Eq. 3 can occur. This may be selected by Alice and
Bob prior to the execution of the protocol.
• Qubit transmission happens over an error-free quantum channel.
C. The SIQKD Algorithm
1. The Quantum Component
A raw key is generated using the following method:
1. At time t1, Alice and Bob share classically correlated random variables X1 and Y1 with
probability distribution P (X1, Y1). Eve may have partial or complete information
about this distribution, and may have provided Alice and Bob with these classical
strings.
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FIG. 2. The generation of a raw key during the quantum part of SIQKD.
2. Alice has at her disposal n qubits, and at time t2, performs measurements on them
according to the binary string U1. Example of such a scheme is the selection of
observables: 0 - A1, 1 - A2.
3. The qubits are transmitted from Alice through the error-free quantum channel to Bob.
4. At time t3, Bob performs measurements on the first k qubits, which will later be used
for a time-like Bell-CHSH check. He selects his observables B1 and B2 based on string
Y1, in a manner similar to that of Alice selecting her observables.
5. At time t4, Bob publicly discloses his observables and probabilities for the first k
qubits. Recall that rather than this referring to individual qubits, each is a qubit
ensemble so that probabilities may be obtained.
6. Alice at t5, having complete knowledge of the k qubits measured at times t2 and t3,
determines whether the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality has been violated. If Eve
had accessed the quantum channel between t2 and t3 then correlations between mea-
surements performed at those times would have been disrupted, and the Bell-CHSH
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inequality would be satisfied. If no eavesdropper is detected, the remaining n − k
qubits are used for key distillation.
7. Bob performs measurements in accordance with Y1 on the remaining n − k qubits.
Classical string Y2 = {yi2}i=ni=k+1 is the result Bob obtains. He calculates V1 = Y1 ⊕ Y2,
where the first k bits in Y1 are disregarded. In a similar manner, the rest of the
protocol makes use of only the last n − k bits of each string. Thus, X2 now denotes
the last n− k of the original bit string X2.
2. The Classical Component
The key is distilled with the help of public discussion over a classical channel as follows:
• Step 1: Alice sends Bob the classical information about U1 by operating with a parity
check matrix, M . That is, she sends the string MU1, as this is more secure than Alice
simply sending U1 [20]. As a parity matrix, M follows, for a linear code U1, u1M
T = 0
for all u1 ∈ U1.
• Step 2: Bob determines W1 = MU1 ⊕ V1, and discloses it to Alice.
• Step 3: Alice determines U2 = MX1 ⊕W1 and discloses it to Bob.
• Step 4: Bob predicts X2 through X ′2 = U2 ⊕ V1.
• Step 5: Alice and Bob then use a pre-determined hash function f to distill the key:
KA = f(X2), KB = f
′(X ′2), where f
′ is a function of f and M . This way, Bob need
not have knowledge of M .
Table I outlines the classical post-processing that occurs in each of the two subsystems.
TABLE I. SIQKD Classical Post-processing in Each of the Two Subsystems
Alice Bob
MU1 = M(X1 ⊕X2) V1 = Y1 ⊕ Y2
U2 = MU1 ⊕ V1 ⊕MX1 W1 = MU1 ⊕ V1
− X ′2 = U2 ⊕ V1 = MX2
D. Toy Problem
To demonstrate SIQKD, a simple example is considered with n = 5, k = 2. Eve distributes
X1 and Y1 to Alice and Bob. Assume the random variables share the trivial distribution in
which bit sequence Y1 = X1. The binary string X2 is locally randomly generated in Alice’s
sealed lab as 10110, of which only the last three bits, 110, will ultimately be used for key
distillation. For the purpose of this example, assume parity matrix M is the identity matrix.
Assume the following measuring mechanism is implemented in their respective subsystems:
0 ≡ A1 = Z,B1 = Z+X√2 , 1 ≡ A2 = Z,B2 = Z−X√2 , which has been experimentally verified
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to violate the Bell-CHSH inequality using quantum optics in [10]. This is equivalent to the
selection of basis |H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉 , |A〉 (see [21] for implementation using optics).
TABLE II. SIQKD Toy Example
Alice Bob
X1 = 10101 Y1 = 01010
X2 = 10110 -
U1 = X1 ⊕X2 = 00011 -
Observable sequence: -
A1, A1, A1, A2, A2 -
- Observable sequence for first k = 2 bits: B1, B2
Bell-CHSH check -
- Y2 = 100 (say) on remaining n− k = 3 bits
- V1 = Y1 ⊕ Y2 = 110
- W1 = MU1 ⊕ V1 = 101
U2 = MX1 ⊕W1 = 000 -
- X ′2 = U2 ⊕ V1 = 110
keyA = F (X2) keyB = F
′(X ′2)
The ideal key length attainable is n− k = 3 bits, and the ideal key rate attainable is 3
5
.
E. Short Note: Key Rate and Hash Function
Note that the key rate portrayed is only an ideal. If E is the random variable that
summarises Eve’s information about X2, and P (E,X2) is the joint distribution of the two,
the length of the final distillable key r and hence, the key rate, depends on the hash function
selected during the final distillation stage of the protocol and the constraints that P (E,X2)
must satisfy.
A hash function f is a function that can be used to map an arbitrarily sized string to
a fixed size string. The function f : X2 → {0, 1}rf is in general randomly selected from
an appropriate class of maps, F , where rf is the length of the final key after application of
the function. This selection is beyond the scope of the current text, but the construction of
these functions, even within the quantum domain is an abiding interest in the cryptographic
community [22–24].
In the ideal scenario, rf = r. This final step in distillation provides a layer of security, so
even if Eve knows partial information of the random string X2, and full information of F ,
she can still extract arbitrarily little information on the key K = f(X2) [16, 25].
IV. CONCLUSION
A secure state-independent quantum key distribution protocol is proposed, in which the
test for eavesdropping is conducted through the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality in light of
the BTCV formalism [1, 2], irrespective of the qubit states. It is shown that this form
manifests naturally from non-commutativity of observables. The SIQKD protocol includes
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a classical part for secure key distillation, which implements prominent features in current
privacy amplification and information reconciliation techniques.
The SIQKD protocol provides a number of additional advantages over current key gener-
ation techniques apart from its novel state-independence. First, it requires less memory than
those employing space-like entangled qubit pairs such as in [5]. It also retains qubits that
would have otherwise been eliminated during checks of basis matching between Alice and
Bob such as those in [3]. This protocol also eliminates a potential worst-case assumption in
current QKD protocols: that Eve initially provides Alice and Bob the entangled qubit pairs.
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